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Program Design, Incentives, 
and Response: Evidence from 
Educational Interventions
1. Introduction
oncerns that U.S. students are not performing as well 
 as their counterparts in other developed countries on 
international math and science tests have led to widespread 
demands for the reform of K-12 education in the United States. 
Of the various reforms under consideration, school voucher 
reform is at the forefront.
Vouchers are scholarships that make students eligible to 
transfer from public to private schools. A basic feature of all 
publicly funded voucher programs in the United States is the 
funding of vouchers by public school revenue, so that money 
always “follows” students. In other words, schools that lose 
students lose their corresponding funding. Schools therefore 
recognize the financial implications of vouchers and have an 
incentive to avoid being subject to voucher programs.
This article investigates the role of program design in the 
context of two such educational interventions in the United 
States—the Milwaukee and Florida school voucher 
programs—and analyzes the effects of design on public school 
incentives and performance.1 We demonstrate that variations 
in program design have markedly different outcomes for public 
schools affected by vouchers.
The Milwaukee program, introduced in 1990, was the first 
voucher program in the country. Implemented in 1999, the 
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• In an effort to reform K-12 education, 
policymakers have introduced vouchers in 
some U.S. school districts, enabling students 
to transfer from public to private schools.
￿ The different designs of two school voucher 
programs—the Milwaukee and Florida 
programs—have had different effects on 
public school incentives and performance.
￿ In Milwaukee, vouchers were imposed from 
the outset; in Florida, schools were first 
threatened with vouchers and thus had 
an incentive to avoid them.
￿ The Florida public schools’ efforts to avoid 
vouchers resulted in performance effects that 
far exceeded those of Milwaukee’s program.
￿ Program design is critical: Policies that 
present failing public schools with functional 
and credible sanctions are best suited to 
provide the results intended by policymakers. 
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Florida program was the nation’s third, following Cleveland’s. 
The Milwaukee and Florida voucher programs share the basic 
feature of funding by public school revenue. But there are 
crucial differences. Milwaukee’s is a means-tested program 
targeting low-income students while Florida’s embeds a 
voucher program in a full-fledged accountability system.
Using test-score data from Milwaukee and Florida and 
implementing a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, 
our study estimates the impact of each program by comparing 
the post-program results of the affected schools with a 
comparable set of control schools. Controlling for potentially 
confounding pre-program time trends and post-program 
common shocks, we find that the performance effects of the 
Florida program far exceed those of Milwaukee’s program. 
These results are quite robust in that they hold after controlling 
for other confounding factors, such as mean reversion and a 
possible stigma effect; they also withstand several sensitivity 
tests.
Our findings have important policy implications, which we 
consider in the context of New York State’s federal, state, and 
city accountability programs. These programs include New 
York City’s accountability policy, known as the “Progress 
Report” policy, and the federal No Child Left Behind (NCLB) 
law, as implemented by New York State.
Our study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
Milwaukee and Florida voucher programs. In Section 3, we 
discuss the incentives created by the programs and the 
corresponding responses that might be expected from the 
affected public schools. Our data and empirical strategy are 
reviewed in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 presents 
our results, and Section 7 considers policy implications.
2. Institutional Details
The first publicly funded school voucher program in the 
United States was established in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 
1990. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program made the city’s 
entire low-income public school population eligible for 
1 Our study focuses on the impact of alternative voucher designs on public 
school performance. A growing body of literature analyzes the many issues 
associated with school vouchers. Nechyba (1996, 1999, 2000, 2003) analyzes 
distributional effects of alternative voucher policies in a general equilibrium 
framework; Epple and Romano (1998, 2002) and Chakrabarti (2009) 
investigate sorting attributable to vouchers; Manski (1992) considers the 
impact of vouchers on public school expenditure and social mobility; and 
McMillan (2004) and Chakrabarti (2008b) model the quality of public schools 
facing vouchers. Hoxby (2003a, b) and Chakrabarti (2008a) study the effects of 
the Milwaukee voucher program, while Greene (2001), Greene and Winters 
(2003), Figlio and Rouse (2006), West and Peterson (2005), and Chakrabarti 
(2007, 2008a) study the effects of the Florida program.
vouchers. Specifically, starting in the 1990-91 school year, 
the program made all Milwaukee public school students with 
family income at or below 175 percent of the poverty line 
eligible for vouchers to attend nonsectarian private schools.
In contrast, the Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program, 
introduced in 1999, can be looked upon as a “threat-of-
voucher” program. Here, failing public schools were 
threatened with the imposition of vouchers, with vouchers 
implemented only if schools failed to meet a government-
designated cutoff quality level. The institutional details of the 
Milwaukee and Florida programs are summarized in Table 1.
The Florida Department of Education classified schools 
according to five grades: A, B, C, D, or F. The state assigned 
school grades based on Florida Comprehensive Assessment 
Test (FCAT) reading, math, and writing scores. For FCAT 
reading and math, it categorized students into five achievement 
levels—1 lowest, 5 highest—that correspond to specific 
ranges on the raw-score scale. Using current-year data, the 
Department of Education assigned an “F” grade to a school if it 
was below the minimum criteria in reading, math, and writing; 
a “D” if it was below the minimum criteria in one or two of the 
three subject areas; and a “C” if it was above the minimum 
criteria in all three subjects, but below the higher performing 
criteria in all three. In reading and math, at least 60 percent 
(50 percent) of students had to score level 2 (3) and above; 
in writing, at least 50 percent (67 percent) had to score 3 and 
above to meet the minimum (high-performing) criteria in 
that respective subject.2
Under the Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program, 
all public school students became eligible for vouchers, or 
2 In 1999, seventy-eight schools received an “F” grade. Students in two of those 
schools became eligible for vouchers. In 2000, four elementary schools received 
an “F,” although none became eligible for vouchers. In 2001, no schools 
received an “F” grade. In 2002, sixty-four schools received an “F.” Students in 
ten of those schools became eligible for vouchers. In 2003, students in nine 
schools became eligible for vouchers; in 2004, the figure was twenty-one 
schools.
The major difference in program design 
between the Milwaukee and Florida 
programs is that in Milwaukee vouchers 
were imposed at the outset, whereas in 
Florida failing schools were first threatened 
with vouchers, with vouchers introduced 
only if the schools failed to show adequate 
improvement in performance.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2010 3
“opportunity scholarships,” if the school received two “F” 
grades in a period of four years. Therefore, a school that 
received an “F” for the first time was exposed to the threat of 
vouchers, but did not face them unless and until it got a second 
“F” within the next three years. Thus, the major difference in 
program design between the Milwaukee and Florida programs 
is that in Milwaukee vouchers were imposed at the outset, 
whereas in Florida failing schools were first threatened with 
vouchers, with vouchers introduced only if the schools failed 
to show adequate improvement in performance.
Apart from the above differences, the design of the two 
programs was strikingly similar. In both programs, private 
schools could not, by law, discriminate against students who 
applied with vouchers—the schools had to accept all students 
unless they were oversubscribed, in which case they had to 
choose students randomly. Indeed, the application form did 
not ask questions about the student’s race, sex, parents’ 
education, past scores, or prior records (for example, truancy, 
violence). The questions were specifically worded only to 
ascertain whether the student was eligible for the program.3 
The system of funding for the Milwaukee and Florida voucher 
programs was also very similar. Under each program, the 
average voucher amount was equal to the state aid per pupil, 
and vouchers were financed by an equivalent reduction of state 
aid to the school district. Thus, state funding was directly tied 
to student enrollment, and enrollment losses due to vouchers 
were reflected in a revenue loss for the public school.4 The 
average voucher amounts under the Milwaukee (1990-91 
through 1996-97) and Florida (1999-2000 through 2001-02) 
programs were $3,346 and $3,330, respectively. During these 
periods, vouchers as a percentage of total revenue per pupil 
were 45.23 percent in Milwaukee and 41.55 percent in Florida.
3 While the schools could not employ any selection criteria for the voucher 
students, this was not the case for nonvoucher students in the same school. 
Also note that the private schools had the choice of whether to participate in 
the program. However, if they decided to participate, they were required by law 
to accept all students or to choose students randomly, if oversubscribed.
Milwaukee Program
First U.S. voucher program 
 Started in 1990-91 school year  
 Public school students with family income at or below 175 percent 
of the poverty line eligible for vouchers to attend nonsectarian 
private schools
 Private schools were not permitted, by law, to discriminate against 
students who apply with vouchers:
– Had to accept all students unless oversubscribed
– If oversubscribed, had to choose students randomly
 Average voucher amount equaled the state aid per pupil, and vouchers 
were financed by an equivalent reduction of state aid to the school district
 1990-91 and 1996-97:
– Average voucher amounts were $3,346
– Vouchers as a percentage of total revenue per pupil were 45.23 percent
Florida Program
 Third U.S. voucher program 
 Started in 1998-99 school year
 Vouchers contingent on school performance 
 Schools classified according to five grades: A, B, C, D, F 
(A-highest, F-lowest)
– Grades based on the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT)
   reading, math, and writing scores
– F, if below the minimum criteria in reading, math, and writing
– D, if below the criteria in one or two of the three subjects
– C, if above the minimum criteria in all three subjects, but below 
   the higher performing criteria in all three
 Students categorized into five achievement levels in FCAT reading 
and math (1-lowest, 5-highest)
 Minimum criteria:
– Reading and math: at least 60 percent must score level 2 and above 
– Writing: at least 50 percent must score level 3 and above 
 High-performing criteria:
– Reading and math: at least 50 percent must score level 3 and above
– Writing: at least 67 percent must score level 3 and above
 All students of a public school became eligible for vouchers if the school
received two “F” grades in a period of four years
 Private schools were not permitted, by law, to discriminate against 
students who apply with vouchers
– Had to accept all students unless oversubscribed
– If oversubscribed, had to choose students randomly
 Average voucher amount equaled the state aid per pupil, and vouchers were 
financed by an equivalent reduction of state aid to the school district 
 1999-2000 and 2001-02:
– Average voucher amounts were $3,330 
– Vouchers as a percentage of total revenue per pupil were 41.55 percent 
Table 1
Comparison of Milwaukee and Florida Voucher Programs
Source: Information and data provided in various Florida Department of Education and Milwaukee Department of Public Instruction reports.4 Program Design, Incentives, and Response
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3. Discussion: Effects of the 
Programs on Public School 
Incentives and Response
What incentives would be created by the aforementioned 
program rules, and how would one expect the affected public 
schools to respond? Consider a public school subject to the 
Florida program, a school that has just received its first “F” 
grade (“F-school” hereafter). The school realizes that if it can 
avoid another “F” grade in the next three years, it can escape 
vouchers and the monetary loss and embarrassment associated 
with them.5 Therefore, it would have an incentive to improve 
its scores so as not to receive a second “F” grade. In contrast, 
if the same school were subject to a Milwaukee-type voucher 
program—in which vouchers have already been introduced—
the school could not avoid vouchers (and the revenue loss) 
altogether. In this case, improvements would serve to retain 
or attract a few students, but the effect would be marginal 
compared with that of a Florida-type program. In a Florida-
type program, the threatened public schools (schools that have 
received their first “F” grade) have more of an incentive to 
respond in order to improve their scores and escape vouchers.6 
Thus, the key difference between the two programs is that in 
the Milwaukee program, vouchers have already been 
implemented, whereas the Florida program first threatens the 
schools and gives them a window to respond, and an adequate 
response can preclude sanctions. Sanctions (vouchers) are 
implemented only if the schools fail to attain the predesignated 
standard.
4 We focus on the Milwaukee program up to 1996-97. The reason is that 
following a 1998 Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling, there was a major shift 
in the program when religious private schools were allowed to participate. 
Moreover, the financing of the Milwaukee program underwent some crucial 
changes, so that the voucher amounts and the revenue loss per student due 
to vouchers were not comparable between the Florida and second-phase 
Milwaukee programs. See Chakrabarti (2008a) for an analysis of how the shift 
in the Milwaukee voucher program affected public school incentives and 
performance as well as for a comparison of public school responses in the two 
phases of the program. We focus on the Florida program up to 2001-02. This 
period is chosen because schools that received an “F” grade in 1999 would 
face the threat of vouchers only through 2002.
5 The loss of students due to vouchers leads to a decrease in both revenue and 
costs for the school. But for a school operating at full capacity, the cost savings 
due to the loss of students are marginal, while the loss in revenue is not. This 
effect is a major reason why public schools do not support vouchers.
6 For a formal proof, see Chakrabarti (2008b).
The intuition above is shown in Chart 1. Let   illustrate 
the initial net revenue function of the public school. The public 
school chooses the effort to maximize net revenue. Let this 
equilibrium effort be denoted by   and the corresponding net 
revenue by  . Now assume that Milwaukee-type vouchers are 
introduced. This leads to a downward shift of the net revenue 
function—the new net revenue function is denoted by   and 
the corresponding optimum effort and net revenue by   and 
, respectively.7 Panel A of the chart illustrates the case in 
which  , and panel B the case in which  . The chart 
implies that any target effort in the range   under a 
threat-of-voucher regime will induce an effort strictly greater 
than  . For example, assume that the policymaker 
implements a target effort,   . Satisfying this target would lead 
to a net revenue of   while failing to satisfy it would lead to 
the introduction of vouchers and corresponding revenue of 
. Therefore, the school has an incentive to implement 
an effort of  .
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In a Florida-type [voucher] program, the 
threatened public schools . . . have more 
of an incentive to respond in order to 
improve their scores and escape vouchers.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2010 5
4. Data
The Florida data consist of school-level data on test scores, 
grades, socioeconomic characteristics of schools, and school 
finances; they are obtained from the Florida Department of 
Education. School-level data on test scores are obtained from 
the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test. Mean scale scores 
(on a scale of 100-500) on grade 4 reading and grade 5 math are 
available for 1998-2002. Mean scale scores (on a scale of 1-6) 
on the Florida grade 4 writing test are available for 1994-2002.
Data on socioeconomic characteristics include sex 
composition (1994-2002), percentage of students eligible for 
free or reduced-price lunch (1997-2002), and race composition 
(1994-2002), and are obtained from the school indicators 
database of the Florida Department of Education. This study 
refers to school years by the calendar year of the spring 
semester. School finance data consist of several measures of 
school-level and district-level per-pupil expenditures, and are 
obtained from the school indicators database and the Office 
of Funding and Financial Reporting of the Florida Department 
of Education.
The Wisconsin data consist of school-level data on test 
scores, socioeconomic characteristics of schools, and per-pupil 
expenditures (both at the school and district levels). The data 
are obtained from the Wisconsin Department of Public 
Instruction, the Milwaukee Public Schools, and the Common 
Core of Data of the National Center for Education Statistics. 
School-level data on test scores are obtained for 1) the Third 
Grade Reading Test (renamed the Wisconsin Reading 
Comprehension Test, or WRCT, in 1996) and 2) the grade 5 
Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS). School scores for the WRCT, 
which was first administered in 1989, are reported in three 
“performance standard categories”: percentage of students 
below, percentage of students at, and percentage of students 
above the standard.8 Data for these three categories are 
available for 1989-97. School-level ITBS reading data (mean 
scores) are available for 1987-93; ITBS math data (mean 
scores) are available for 1987-97.
5. Empirical Strategy
5.1 Florida
In Florida, the schools that received an “F” grade in 1999 were 
directly exposed to the threat of vouchers because all their 
students would be eligible for vouchers if the school received 
8 The method of reporting ITBS math and WRCT reading scores changed 
in 1998. Therefore, we use pre-1998 scores.
another “F” in the next three years. These F-schools constitute 
the group of treated schools. Schools that received a “D” grade 
in 1999 were closest to the F-schools in terms of grade, but were 
not directly treated by the program. These “D-schools” 
constitute the group of control schools. The treatment and 
control groups consist of 65 and 457 elementary schools, 
respectively.9 Because the program was announced in 
June 1999 and the grades were based on tests held in February 
1999, we classify schools into treatment and control groups on 
the basis of their pre-program scores and grades.
The identifying assumption here is that if the F-schools and 
D-schools have similar trends in scores in the pre-program 
period, any shift of the F-schools compared with the D-schools 
in the post-program period can be attributed to the program. 
To test this assumption, we first run the following fixed-effects 
regression (and its ordinary least squares [OLS] counterpart) 
using only pre-program data:
(1) ,
where   is the mean score of school i in year t,   are school-
fixed effects, t denotes a time trend, F is a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 for F-schools and 0 for D-schools, F*t is an 
interaction between the F dummy and trend,   denotes the 
set of school characteristics, and   is a stochastic error term. 
Scores considered in the Florida part of the analysis include 
mean school scores in FCAT reading, FCAT math, and FCAT 
writing. The pre-program difference in trend of the F-schools 
is captured in  .
If F-schools and D-schools have similar pre-program 
trends, we investigate whether the F-schools demonstrate a 
higher improvement in test scores in the post-program era 
using specification 2 below. If the treated F-schools 
demonstrate a differential pre-program trend, then in addition 
to estimating this specification, we estimate a modified version 
in which we control for the pre-program differences in trends.
We estimate a completely unrestricted and nonlinear model 
that includes year dummies to control for common year 
effects and interactions of post-program year dummies with 
9 We restrict our analysis to elementary schools because there were too few 
middle and high schools that received an “F” grade in 1999 (seven and five, 
respectively) to justify analysis.





If the F-schools and D-schools have 
similar trends in scores in the pre-program 
period, any shift of the F-schools 
compared with the D-schools in the post-
program period can be attributed to the 
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the F-school dummy to capture individual post-program year 
effects:
(2) ,
where  ,   are year dummies 
for 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively. While the above 
specification includes school-fixed effects, we also estimate an 
OLS counterpart to it. OLS regressions corresponding to both 
specifications 1 and 2 include a dummy for the treatment 
group F. Note that this is absorbed in the fixed-effects 
regressions because it is a time-invariant school effect.
Specification 2 does not constrain the post-program year-
to-year gains of the F-schools to be equal and allows the 
program effect to vary across years. The coefficients 
 represent the effect of one, two, and 
three years into the program, respectively, for the F-schools. 
Given the nature of the Florida program, the 1999 threatened 
schools (that is, the schools that received an “F” grade in 1999) 
would be exposed to the threat of vouchers for the next three 
years only. Therefore, we track the performance of the 
threatened schools (relative to the control schools) for three 
years after the program—2000, 2001, and 2002—when the 
threat of vouchers would be in effect.
The above specifications assume that the D-schools were 
not affected by the program. Although the D-schools did not 
face any direct threat from the program, they might have faced 
an indirect threat because they were close to receiving an “F” 
grade.10 Therefore, we next allow the F-schools and D-schools 
to be different treated groups (with varying intensities of 
treatment) and compare their post-program improvements, if 
any, with 1999 “C-schools,” which are the next grade up in the 
scale using the above specifications after adjusting for another 
treatment group. It should be noted that since D-schools and 
C-schools may face the threat to some extent, our estimates 
may be underestimates (lower bounds), but not overestimates.
5.2 Milwaukee
Our strategy is based on and is similar to that of Hoxby 
(2003b). Since students in the Milwaukee Public Schools 
eligible for free or reduced-price lunch were also eligible for 
vouchers, the extent of treatment of the Milwaukee schools 
depended on the percentage of students eligible for free or 
reduced-price lunch.11 Using this information, Hoxby 
10 In fact, there is some anecdotal evidence that D-schools may have responded 
to the program. The superintendent of Hillsborough County, which had no 
F-schools in 1999, announced that he would take a 5 percent pay cut if any of 
his thirty-seven D-schools received an “F” grade on the next school report card. 
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classifies the Milwaukee schools into two treatment groups 
based on the percentages of students eligible for free or 
reduced-price lunch—“most treated” (at least two-thirds of 
students eligible in the pre-program period) and “somewhat 
treated” (less than two-thirds of students eligible in the pre-
program period).
We classify the schools into three treatment groups (in 
contrast to Hoxby’s two) based on their pre-program (1989-90 
school year) percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-
price lunch. Thus, our treatment groups are more homogenous 
as well as starker from each other. Additionally, to test the 
robustness of our results, we consider alternative samples 
obtained by varying the cutoffs that separate the different 
treatment groups, departing from the Hoxby approach. 
The 60-47 (66-47) sample classifies schools that have at least 
60 percent (66 percent) of students eligible for free or reduced-
price lunch as “more treated,” schools with such population 
between 60 percent (66 percent) and 47 percent as “somewhat 
treated,” and schools with such population less than 47 percent 
as “less treated.” We also consider alternative classifications, 
such as “66” and “60” samples, where there are two treatment 
groups—schools that have at least 66 percent (60 percent) of 
students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch are designated 
as more treated schools, and schools with such population 
below 66 percent (60 percent) as somewhat treated schools. 
Since there were very few middle and high schools in the 
Milwaukee Public Schools and student participation in the 
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program was mostly in the 
elementary grades, we restrict our analysis to elementary 
schools.
11 Under the Milwaukee program, all households at or below 175 percent of 
the poverty line are eligible to apply for vouchers. Households at or below 
185 percent of the poverty line are eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. 
However, the cutoff of 175 percent is not strictly enforced (Hoxby 2003a), 
and households within this 10 percent margin are often permitted to apply. 
In addition, there were very few students who fell in the 175 percent-
185 percent range, while in fact 90 percent of students eligible for free or 
reduced-price lunch qualified for free lunch (Witte 2000). Students below 
135 percent of the poverty line qualified for free lunch.
Since students in the Milwaukee Public 
Schools eligible for free or reduced-price 
lunch were also eligible for vouchers, 
the extent of treatment of the Milwaukee 
schools depended on the percentage 
of students eligible for free or reduced-
price lunch.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2010 7
Our control group criteria are also based on Hoxby (2003b). 
Since all schools in Milwaukee were potentially affected by the 
program, Hoxby constructs a control group that consists of 
Wisconsin schools outside Milwaukee that satisfy the following 
criteria in the pre-program period that: 1) had at least 25 per-
cent of their population eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, 
2) had black students who make up at least 15 percent of the 
population, and 3) were urban. Her control group consists 
of twelve schools.
For our control schools, we designate schools that are 
located outside Milwaukee but within Wisconsin, satisfy 
Hoxby’s first two criteria, and have locales as similar as possible 
to the Milwaukee schools. Note that all of these characteristics 
pertain to the pre-program school year 1989-90.12
Using each sample, we investigate how the different 
treatment groups in Milwaukee responded to the “voucher 
shock” program. Using specification 3 below, we first test 
whether the pre-program trends of the untreated and the 
different treated groups were the same. We then estimate OLS 
and fixed-effects versions of specification 4 below. If we 
observe differences in pre-existing trends between the different 
treated groups of schools, then in addition to estimating 
specification 4, we estimate modified versions of the 
specification that control for pre-existing differences in trends:
(3)            
(4) ,
where   denotes scores of school i in period t; , 
 are year dummies for 1989 through 
2007, respectively;   for the WRCT and 
 for the ITBS, where MT denotes “more treated,” 
ST denotes “somewhat treated,” and LT denotes “less treated.” 
The scores considered are mean scores in ITBS reading and 
ITBS math as well as percentages of students above the 
standard in WRCT reading.
6. Results
Table 2 presents baseline characteristics of treated and control 
groups in Florida and Wisconsin. It shows that the more 
treated schools in Florida were indeed similar to the more 
12 The more treated and control group characteristics are presented in Table 2. 
In the 66-47 sample, the somewhat treated (less treated) group had an average 
of 55.4 percent (37.17 percent) of students eligible for free or reduced-price 
lunch, 50.99 percent (45.37 percent) who were black, and 4.09 percent 
(3.83 percent) who were Hispanic.
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treated schools in Wisconsin and, except in one case, the 
differences between them were not statistically significant. 
Similarly, the control schools in Florida were similar to the 
control schools in Wisconsin, and the differences between 
them were not statistically significant.
However, the treated schools were somewhat different 
from the control schools within each state. The reason is that 
Wisconsin schools outside Milwaukee were considerably more 
advantaged than schools in Milwaukee. We arrived at this 
control group despite using the strategy (following Hoxby 
[2003a, b]) of selecting control schools as similar as possible to 
Milwaukee’s more treated schools in terms of pre-program 
characteristics.
It is important that both the more treated schools and the 
control groups be similar across the two programs in terms of 
pre-program characteristics as well as across the two locations. 
As a result, for purposes of comparing effects across the two 
Table 2
Pre-Program Demographic Characteristics of Florida 
and Wisconsin More Treated and Control Schools 
Percent
 
Panel A: More Treated Schools
Wisconsin  Florida–Wisconsin
Florida 66-47 60-47  66-47  60-47
Black 62.79 66.55 62.90 -3.76 -0.10
(28.23) (32.22) (29.58) [0.56] [0.99]
Hispanic 18.95 18.07 14.81 0.88 4.14
(23.40) (24.54) (21.86) [0.87] [0.36]
White 17.18 10.21 17.38 6.97 -0.20
(19.54) (10.68) (16.55) [0.07] [0.96]
Male 51.38 52.25 52.33 -0.87 -0.95
(4.84) (2.60) (2.58) [0.34] [0.22]
Free or reduced-











Panel B: Control Schools
Florida Wisconsin Florida–Wisconsin
Black 18.12 22.37 -4.25
(14.17) (12.93) [0.10]
Hispanic 15.49 14.84 0.17
(21.23) (6.02) [0.86]
White 63.59 60.85 2.73
(22.33) (12.80) [0.49]
Male 51.38 50.63 0.76 
(4.84) (2.29) [0.43]
Free or reduced-








Notes: The group of Florida more treated and control schools is composed 
of F-schools and C-schools, respectively. Samples 66-47 and 60-47 are 
described in Section 5.2 of the article. Standard deviations are in 
parentheses; p-values are in brackets.8 Program Design, Incentives, and Response
programs, we use the C-schools in Florida as the control group. 
Noticeably, the control group in Wisconsin was very similar to 
the C-schools in Florida and was not statistically different from 
them in terms of any characteristics (Table 2). Still another 
reason for selecting the C-schools as the control group in Florida 
was that while the D-schools were more similar to the more 
treated F-schools in terms of grade and demographics, they were 
very close to receiving an “F” grade; hence, to some extent they 
perceived an indirect threat and to some extent were treated by 
the program.
Because of differences between the treated and control 
schools, one might argue that in the absence of the program, 
the control group would have evolved differently from the 
more treated group. However, multiple years of pre-program 
data allow us to check (and control) for any differences in 
pre-program trends of these groups. In this way, we can dispose 
of any level differences between the treated and control groups 
as well as control for differences in pre-program trends, if any. 
It seems likely that once we control for differences in trends as 
well as in levels, any remaining differences between the treated 
and control groups will be minimal. In other words, our 
identifying assumption is that if the treated schools followed 
the same trends as the control schools in the immediate pre-
program period, they would have evolved similarly in the 
immediate post-program period in the absence of the program. 
We also control for time-varying observable characteristics. 
School-fixed effects remove any time-invariant unobservable 
characteristics. Note that while time-varying unobserved 
characteristics cannot be directly controlled for, they did not 
drive the results as long as the F-schools did not experience a 
differential shock in unobserved characteristics that coincided 
with the timing of the program.
6.1 Florida
Considerable anecdotal evidence suggests that F-schools have 
responded to the voucher program. Just after the program’s 
inception, Escambia County implemented a 210-day extended 
school year in its F-schools (the typical duration was 180 days), 
introduced an extended school day at least twice a week, and 
added small-group tutoring on afternoons and Saturdays and 
longer time blocks for writing and math instruction. To curb 
absenteeism, the county started an automated phone system to 
contact parents when a child is absent. Miami-Dade County 
hired 210 additional teachers for its twenty-six F-schools, 
switched to phonics instruction, and encouraged parents (many 
of whom were dropouts) to go back to school for a high-school-
equivalency diploma. Broward County reduced its class size to 
eighteen to twenty students in its low-performing schools and 
increased services for children whose primary language is not 
English. Palm Beach County targeted its fourth-grade teachers 
for coaching and began more frequent and closer observation of 
teachers in its F-schools (Innerst 2000). Carmen Varela-Russo, 
Associate Superintendent of Technology, Strategic Planning, 
and Accountability at Broward County Public Schools, described 
the situation this way: “People get lulled into complacency . . . the 
possibility of losing children to private schools or other districts 
was a strong message to the whole community” (Innerst 2000). 
The analysis below investigates whether the data in Florida 
support this behavior.
Chart 2, which depicts trends in reading, math, and writing 
scores in F-schools and D-schools, shows that 1999 was the 
watershed year. In both reading and math, the F-schools had 
similar trends before the program. However, the F-schools 
showed improvement relative to the D-schools after the 
program, and the gap between F- and D-schools narrowed. In 
writing, while the F-schools were deteriorating relative to the 
D-schools before the program, this pattern changed after it. 
The F-schools showed improvement relative to the D-schools 
to the extent that they successfully closed the “F” to “D” gap 
after the program.
We now turn to our estimation results. All regressions 
control for ethnicity (the percentage of students in different 
racial categories in a school), the percentage of male students, 
the percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price 
lunch, and real per-pupil expenditures. Table 3 presents pre-
program trends in reading, math, and writing. It reveals that 
F-schools have no significant differences in trend compared 
with D-schools in reading and math, although they exhibit a 
small, negative differential trend in writing. Compared with 
C-schools, F-schools exhibit a negative differential trend in 
reading and writing, but no significant differential trend in 
math. D-schools exhibit a negative trend in reading and a 
positive trend in math and writing compared with C-schools. 
Whenever there is a difference in pre-program trends, our 
reported regressions control for these differences by including 
interactions between trend and the respective treated 
dummies.
Considerable anecdotal evidence 
suggests that F-schools have responded 

































Table 4, columns 1-3 present the effects of the Florida 
threat-of-voucher program on F-school reading, math, and 
writing scores compared with those for D-schools. All models 
reported include school-fixed effects. The results from our OLS 
estimation are similar to the fixed-effects estimates and hence 
are not reported. The regressions for writing include 
interactions of the “F” dummy with trend to control for 
differences in pre-program trends seen above.13,14 The table 
shows economically large, positive, and statistically significant 
effects in each subject area and year.
D-schools are considered as an additional treatment group 
in Table 4, columns 4-6. Here, we see how the program affects 
F-schools (more treated) and D-schools (less treated) 
compared with C-schools. All columns control for differences 
in pre-existing trends between groups. The results show 
positive, significant year effects in reading, math, and writing 
for F-schools in each of the years after the program’s 
implementation. Although many of the D-school effects are 
also positive and significant, the F-school shifts are statistically 
larger in each year.15 The F-school effects are economically 
meaningful as well. In reading, relative to the base year, 
F-schools showed a 3.6 percent improvement in the first year 
after the program, a 4.2 percent improvement after the second 
year, and a 6.3 percent improvement after the third year. 
In math, F-schools showed a 3.4 percent, 4.2 percent, and 
4.5 percent improvement in the first, second, and third years, 
respectively, after implementation of the program. In writing, 
the percentage improvement was around 15 percent. At the 
end of 2002 (three years after program implementation), the 
pre-program gap between F-schools and C-schools was closed 
by 37.08 percent in reading, 30.31 percent in math, and around 
75 percent in writing.
In summary, based on different samples, different subjects, 
and both OLS and fixed-effects estimates, our results show 
considerable improvement in the F-schools after the program 
compared with the control schools. Although D-schools show 
non-negligible improvement (at least in reading and writing), 
their improvement is considerably less than and statistically 
different from that of the F-schools.
13 Note that the table reports only the coefficients that reflect program effects; 
therefore, the coefficient corresponding to this interaction term (which 
captures the differential pre-existing trend) is not reported. Pre-existing 
trends are reported in Table 3.
14 The regressions for reading and math (columns 1 and 2) do not include this 
interaction term because there is no evidence of differential pre-program 
trends in reading and math for F-schools and D-schools (Table 3). Note that 
the results with inclusion of this term remain very similar.
15 Here, we test whether the F-school effects are statistically different from 
the D-school effects against the null hypothesis that they are equal.
Our results show considerable 
improvement in the F-schools after the 
program compared with the control 
schools.10 Program Design, Incentives, and Response
Table 3
Pre-Program Trend of F-, D-, and C-Schools in Florida
Sample of F- and D-Schools Sample of F-, D-, and C-Schools

























Trend 0.41 -0.05 13.20*** 13.02** 0.20** 0.21** 2.66** 2.70 9.79*** 10.20*** 0.18*** 0.19***
(0.56) (0.47) (0.55) (0.61) (0.008) (0.003) (0.57) (0.36) (0.53) (0.38) (0.01) (0.002)
F * trend -1.78 -2.01 -0.98 -0.72 -0.05*** -0.04*** -3.80 -4.77*** 2.46 1.96 -0.03*** -0.03***
(2.47) (1.46) (1.44) (1.48) (0.011) (0.007) (2.29) (1.41) (1.51) (1.43) (0.01) (0.01)
D * trend -2.29*** -2.69*** 3.46*** 2.79*** 0.02** 0.02***
(0.66) (0.57) (0.60) (0.67) (0.007) (0.003)
C o n t r o l s YYYYYYYYYYYY
Observations 1,013 1,013 1,006 1,006 2,948 2,948 2,386 2,386 2,377 2,377 6,982 6,982
R2 0.58 0.93 0.59 0.90 0.64 0.80 0.76 0.95 0.74 0.93 0.65 0.82
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: FCAT is the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test; OLS is ordinary least squares regression; FE is fixed-effects regression. Controls include race, 
sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, and real per-pupil expenditure. Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. 
All regressions are weighted by the number of students tested.
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2010 11
Table 4
Effect of “Threatened Status” on FCAT Reading, Math, and Writing Scores
Sample of Treated F- and Control D-Schools in Florida
Reading Math Writing Reading Math Writing
FE FE FE FE FE FE
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
Treated * one year after program 4.85*** 6.78*** 0.35***
(1.68) (1.63) (0.04)
Treated * two years after program 3.30* 7.25*** 0.37***
(1.71) (1.82) (0.04)
Treated * three years after program 7.08*** 5.35*** 0.43
(1.78) (2.00) (0.05)
Less treated * one year after program 3.53*** 0.97 0.05**
(0.76) (0.85) (0.02)
Less treated * two years after program 5.52*** 2.54*** 0.00
(0.80) (0.94) (0.02)
Less treated * three years after program  7.94*** 3.47*** -0.03
(0.87) (0.92) (0.02)
More treated * one year after program 9.32b*** 8.96b*** 0.39b***
(1.87) (1.59) (0.04)
More treated * two years after program 10.75a*** 11.00b*** 0.37a***
(1.87) (1.77) (0.04)
More treated * three years after program 16.03b*** 11.94b*** 0.39a***
(1.91) (1.95) (0.05)
School-fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y e a r  d u m m i e s   YYYYYY
C o n t r o l s YYYYYY
Observations 2,550 2,524 4,476 5,933 5,909 10,587
R2 0.77 0.76 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.86
p-valuec   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: FCAT is the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test. FCAT scores for reading and math are for the period 1998-2000; FCAT scores for writing are 
for the period 1994-2002. FE is fixed-effects regression. Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. Controls include race, sex, percentage of students 
eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, and real per-pupil expenditure. All regressions are weighted by the number of students tested. 
a More treated significantly different from less treated at 5 percent level.
b More treated significantly different from less treated at 1 percent level.
c p-value of F-test of the program effect on treated schools. 
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.12 Program Design, Incentives, and Response
6.2 Milwaukee
The Milwaukee analysis uses the 66-47 sample. Estimation 
results for pre-program trends are presented in Table 5. 
The results show no statistical difference in trends between 
the various treated and control groups in any subject area.
Table 6 examines the effect of the Milwaukee “voucher 
shock” program on the WRCT (the percentage above), ITBS 
reading, and ITBS math scores of different treated groups. 
Except for the positive and statistically significant effect in 
WRCT reading in the test’s second year, there is no statistically 
significant evidence of any effect of the program. Although 
the second year’s somewhat treated effect in ITBS math is 
statistically significant, it is more than the corresponding 
more treated effect.16
Thus, the results in Milwaukee are mixed. The program 
seems to have had a positive and significant effect in the second 
year after the program’s implementation, at least in the WRCT. 
16 Since the ITBS was administered in Milwaukee as a district assessment 
program, we do not have data on non–Milwaukee, Wisconsin, schools for this 
test. As a result, our comparison group is the less treated group of schools. 
Since the comparison group is also treated to some extent, we expect our 
estimates for the ITBS to be lower bounds.
These results seem to be robust in that they are replicated in the 
analysis with other samples.17 Chart 3 presents the trends in 
ITBS scores for the various groups. As expected, there is no 
evidence of any program effect.
17 These results are not reported here, but are available from the author.
Table 5
Pre-Program Trend of More Treated, Somewhat Treated, and Less Treated Schools in Milwaukee 
WRCT (Percentage above) ITBS Reading ITBS Math
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trend -3.84 -4.34** -4.09 -3.45 -3.04* 2.52**
(2.33) (2.16) (4.11) (3.42) (1.66) (0.98)
More treated * trend -3.08 -2.03 4.01 -1.88 0.56 0.32
(3.41) (3.35) (3.69) (2.73) (1.97) (1.40)
Somewhat treated * trend -4.41 -3.61 3.14 2.12 0.73 0.31 
(3.01) (2.67) (4.05) (3.17) (1.83) (1.21)
Less treated * trend -2.33 -3.23
(3.61) (3.10)
Observations 242 242 411 411 410 410
R2 0.50 0.87 0.30 0.56 0.30 0.71
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: WRCT is the Wisconsin Reading Comprehension Test; ITBS is the Iowa Test of Basic Skills; OLS is ordinary least squares regression; FE is fixed-effects 
regression. Controls include race, sex, and percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch.  
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
The results show no statistical difference 
in trends between the various treated and 
control groups in any subject area. . . . 
Except for the positive and statistically 
significant effect in [Wisconsin Reading 
Comprehension Test] reading in the test’s 
second year, there is no statistically 
significant evidence of any effect of the 
program. . . . Thus, the results in 
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School-fixed effects Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y
Observations 1,195 717 1,127
R2 0.58 0.55 0.60
p-valuea 0.11 0.62 0.27
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: WRCT is the Wisconsin Reading Comprehension Test; ITBS is the 
Iowa Test of Basic Skills. Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. 
All regressions include school-fixed effects and control for race, sex, 
percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, and 
real per-pupil expenditure.  
a p-value of the F-test of joint significance of more treated shift 
coefficients.
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.14 Program Design, Incentives, and Response
7. Robustness Checks
7.1 Mean Reversion
Several factors might bias the results; we consider each factor 
and its potential solutions. First is the issue of mean reversion. 
Mean reversion is the statistical tendency whereby high- 
or low-scoring schools tend to score closer to the mean 
subsequently. Because the F-schools scored low in 1999, a 
natural question would be whether the improvement in Florida 
is driven by mean reversion rather than the voucher program. 
Since we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis, our 
estimates will be tainted by mean reversion only if F-schools 
mean-revert to a greater extent than do the D-schools or the 
C-schools, or both.
To investigate mean reversion, we examine whether and by 
how much schools that received an “F” grade in 1998 improved 
during the 1998-99 academic year compared with those that 
received a “D” (or “C”) grade in 1998. Since these years fall 
within the pre-program period, the gain can be taken to 
approximate the mean-reversion effect and can be subtracted 
from the post-program gain of F-schools compared with 
D-schools (or C-schools) to get at the mean-reversion-
corrected program effect.
The accountability system of assigning letter grades to 
schools began in 1999. The pre-1999 accountability system 
classified schools into four groups, designated 1 (low) to 4 
(high). However, using the state grading criteria and data on 
the percentage of students in different achievement levels in 
each FCAT reading, math, and writing, we assigned letter 
grades to schools in 1998 and implemented the above strategy. 
Schools receiving “F,” “D,” and “C” grades in 1998 using this 
procedure are referred to as “98F-schools,” “98D-schools,” and 
“98C-schools,” respectively.
Using Florida data for 1998 and 1999, we demonstrate in 
Table 7, panel A, that when compared with the 98D-schools, 
the 98F-schools show no evidence of mean reversion either in 
reading or math, although there is mean reversion in writing. 
Compared with the 98C-schools (panel B), there is no evidence 
of mean reversion in reading; both 98D-schools and 98F-
schools show comparable amounts of mean reversion in math; 
only 98F-schools show mean reversion in writing.
Table 7
Mean Reversion of 98F-Schools Compared 
with 98D- and 98C-Schools, 1998-99
Panel A: 98F- and 98D-Schools








Trend 2.01*** 14.02*** 0.04***
(0.43) (0.49) (0.01)
98F * trend -0.65 1.17 0.14***
(1.14) (1.19) (0.02)
Observations 1,353 1,354 1,355
R2 0.93 0.91 0.85
Panel B: 98F-, 98D-, and 98C-Schools








Trend 1.76*** 9.71*** 0.03***
(0.35) (0.36) (0.01)
98F * trend -0.55 4.63*** 0.14***
(1.12) (1.16) (0.02)
98D * trend 0.16 4.22*** 0.01
(0.54) (0.58) (0.01)
Observations 2,605 2,608 2,608
R2 0.96 0.94 0.87
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: FCAT is the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test; FE is fixed-
effects regression. All regressions control for race, sex, percentage of 
students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, and real per-pupil 
expenditure. The ordinary least squares regressions include 98F- and 
98D-school dummies. In the sample of 98F- and 98D-schools, the 
standard deviations of FCAT reading, math, and writing are 18.9, 18.05, 
and 0.30, respectively. In the sample of 98F-, 98D-, and 98C-schools, the 
standard deviations of FCAT reading, math, and writing are 21.16, 21.56, 
and 0.31, respectively.
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
  **Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2010 15
7.2 Stigma Effect of Getting the Lowest
Performing Grade
A second concern in Florida is the potential stigma effect of 
receiving a performance grade of “F.” If there is such a stigma, 
the F-schools will try to improve only to avoid this stigma 
rather than in response to the program. We use several 
alternative strategies to investigate this possibility. First, 
although the system of assigning letter grades to schools started 
in 1999, Florida had an accountability system in the pre-1999 
period when schools were categorized into four groups, 
designated 1 (low) to 4 (high), based on FCAT writing and 
reading and math norm-referenced test scores. Using FCAT 
writing data for two years (1997 and 1998), we investigate 
whether the schools, which were categorized in group 1 in 
1997, improved in relation to the 1997 group 2 and group 3 
schools in 1997-98.18 Our rationale is that if a stigma effect 
is associated with getting the lowest performing grade, the 
group 1 schools should improve relative to the group 2 and 3 
schools, even in the absence of the threat-of-voucher program.
Table 8, using pre-program FCAT writing scores, shows that 
no such stigma effect exists—group 1 schools display no 
improvement relative to the group 2 or group 3 schools.
Second, all the schools that received an “F” grade in 1999 
received higher grades in 2000, 2001, and 2002. Therefore, 
although the stigma effect on F-schools may be operative in 
2000, this is not likely to be the case in 2001 or 2002 since none 
of the F-schools received an “F” grade in the preceding year 
(2000 or 2001, respectively). However, the F-schools would 
face the threat of vouchers until 2002, so any improvement in 
18 We do not use the pre-1999 reading and math norm-referenced test 
(NRT) scores because different districts used different NRTs during this 
period, which varied in content and norms. Also, districts often chose 
different NRTs in different years. Thus, these NRTs were not comparable 
across districts and across time. Moreover, since districts could choose the 
specific NRT to administer each year, the choice was likely related to time-
varying (and also time-invariant) district-unobservable characteristics that 
also affected test scores.
Table 8
Is There a Stigma Effect of Getting the Lowest Performing Grade? 
Effect of Being Categorized in Group 1 on FCAT Writing Scores
Using FCAT Writing Scores, 1997-98













Trend 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.46***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Group 1 * trend -0.01  -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Group 2 * trend 0.03 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Controls N N Y N N Y
Observations 314 314 314 1,361 1,361 1,358
R2 0.49 0.84 0.85 0.52 0.87 0.87
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: FCAT is the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test; OLS is ordinary least squares regression; FE is fixed-effects regression. Huber-White standard 
errors are in parentheses. All regressions are weighted by the number of students tested; controls include race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free 
or reduced-price lunch, and real per-pupil expenditure. The OLS regressions include group 1 and group 2 dummies. 
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
If there is [a low-performance] stigma, 
the F-schools will try to improve only to 
avoid this stigma, rather than in response 
to the program. 16 Program Design, Incentives, and Response
2001 and 2002 would provide evidence in favor of the threat-
of-voucher effect and against the stigma effect. F-schools 
showed strong gains in both 2001 and 2002—a result that 
provides further support for the threat-of-voucher effect and 
against the stigma effect.
7.3 Sorting
Another factor relates to sorting in the context of the 
Milwaukee voucher program. Vouchers affect public school 
quality not only through direct public school response but also 
through changes in student composition and peer quality 
brought about by sorting. These three factors are then reflected 
in the public school scores.19 This issue is important in 
Milwaukee because over the years students have left the city’s 
public schools with vouchers. In contrast, no Florida school 
became eligible for vouchers in 2000 or 2001. Therefore, the 
program effects (for each of the years 2000, 2001, and 2002) are 
not likely to be tainted by this factor.20 Moreover, as we discuss 
shortly, the demographic compositions of the different groups 
of schools remained very similar across the years under 
consideration.
We also examine whether the demographic composition 
of the different Milwaukee treated groups changed over the 
years (Table 9). No such evidence is found. Only a few of the 
coefficients are statistically significant, and they are always very 
small in magnitude. They imply changes of less than 1 percent, 
more precisely, ranging between 0.22 percent and 0.65 percent. 
This result suggests that sorting was not an important factor. 
Note that we conducted the same exercise for Florida as well 
and found no evidence of any relative shift of the demographic 
composition of the F-schools compared with the D-schools 
or C-schools.
19 See Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) for a discussion.
20 This does not mean that the Florida program was not credible. Ten schools 
received a second “F” grade in 2002, nine schools in 2003, and twenty-one in 
2004; all of these students became eligible for vouchers.
A Comparison of Program Effects in Florida
and Milwaukee
Since Florida and Milwaukee are in different regions, we argue 
that our comparison of the effects of the two programs is fair 
and reasonable. First, as mentioned earlier, apart from the 
crucial design differences between the two programs, the other 
features of the programs were very similar. In both programs, 
private schools could not discriminate against voucher 
applicants. Also, the method of funding for the two programs, 
the average voucher amounts, and the per-pupil revenue losses 
from vouchers were very similar. Second, state and local 
revenues constituted very similar proportions of total revenue 
during the relevant periods—the percentages of revenue from 
state and local sources were 51 percent and 41 percent, 
respectively, in Florida, and 55 percent and 36 percent, 
respectively, in Milwaukee. Third, the demographic 
characteristics of the more treated and control schools in 
Florida were very similar, both economically and statistically, 
to those of the more treated and control schools in Milwaukee 
Table 9
Effect of Milwaukee Program on Demographic 






















More treated * program -1.0 1.57 0.65*
(1.34) (0.81) (0.37)
























Observations 1,228 1,226 1,216
R2 0.95 0.97 0.91
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions 
are weighted by the number of students tested. All columns include a 
time trend, a program dummy that takes a value of 1 after the program, 
and an interaction between program dummy and trend. 
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Vouchers affect public school quality 
not only through direct public school 
response but also through changes in 
student composition and peer quality 
brought about by sorting.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2010 17
(Table 2). Fourth, we repeat our analysis by comparing the 
improvement in Milwaukee with that of a large urban district 
in Florida: Miami-Dade County (the state’s largest school 
district). The results are very similar and hence are not reported 
here. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, since we follow a 
difference-in-differences strategy in trends, any level or even 
trend differences between the two regions (that are common to 
schools in that region) are differenced out. It is unlikely that 
any remaining difference, which differentially affects the trends 
in the two regions only in the post-program period, will be 
large.
Table 10 compares the effects of the Florida and Milwaukee 
programs on their respective more treated schools both before 
and after correcting for mean reversion. Figures are based on 
data in Tables 4 and 6, and all numbers are expressed in terms 
of their respective sample standard deviations. Columns 1-4 
present results before correcting for mean reversion; columns 
5-8 present results corrected for mean reversion. Pre-
correction results show positive and significant effect sizes in 
each of the years and subject areas in Florida, which always 
exceed the corresponding Milwaukee effect sizes (which are not 
significant, except in second-year reading). Mean-reversion-
corrected effect sizes are obtained by subtracting the effect size 
attributed to mean reversion (obtained from expressing the 
relevant coefficients in Table 7, panel B, in terms of respective 
standard deviations) from the F-school effect sizes (obtained 
from expressing the more treated coefficients in Table 4, 
columns 4-6, in terms of respective sample standard 
deviations) in each of the three years after the program. The 
estimates in reading are the same as those described earlier. 
In math, although the effect sizes fall in Florida, they are still 
positive and considerably larger than those in Milwaukee. In 
reading (math), relative to the control schools, the F-schools 
show an improvement of 0.47 (0.24) standard deviations in the 
first year after the program, 0.5 (0.34) standard deviations after 
the second year, and 0.8 (0.39) standard deviations after the 
third year. Mean-reversion-corrected effect sizes in writing are 
0.29, 0.25, and 0.29 in the first, second, and third years, 
respectively, after the program. Note that since none of the 
F-schools received an “F” grade in either 2000 or 2001, the 
mean-reversion-corrected effect sizes attributed to the Florida 
program in the second and third years may be underestimates.
Table 10
Comparison of Results from Florida “Threat-of-Voucher” and Milwaukee “Voucher-Shock” Programs 
Using Standardized Reading and Math Scores 
Corrected for Mean Reversion 

























More treated * one year 
after program
-0.06 0.47*** -0.24 0.45*** -0.06 0.47*** -0.24 0.24***
More treated * two years 
after program
0.38* 0.50*** 0.26 0.55*** 0.38* 0.50*** 0.26 0.34***
More treated * three years 
after program
0.35 0.80*** -0.13 0.60*** 0.36 0.80*** -0.13 0.39***
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: Reading test scores are from the Wisconsin Reading Comprehensive Test (WRCT), 1989-97, and the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT) 
Reading, 1998-2002. Math test scores are from the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) Math, 1986-97, and the FCAT Math, 1998-2002. All figures are respective 
sample standard deviations. All figures are obtained from regressions that contain school-fixed effects, year dummies, interactions of year dummies with the 
respective treatment dummies, race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, and real per-pupil expenditure. Standard deviation 
of FCAT reading scores = 20; standard deviation of FCAT math scores = 20; standard deviation of WRCT (percentage above) reading scores = 16; standard 
deviation of ITBS reading scores = 18.45; standard deviation of ITBS math scores = 16.71. For standard deviations corresponding to the mean reversion 
sample, see the notes to Table 4.
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.18 Program Design, Incentives, and Response
8. Lessons for New York City
Our analysis of school voucher programs implies that policies 
that threaten underperforming public schools (or other agents) 
with functional and credible sanctions can induce them to 
respond in a way intended or desired by the policymaker. This 
finding has important implications for some educational 
policies in New York City. These include New York City’s own 
accountability policy, also known as the “Progress Report” 
policy, and the federal No Child Left Behind law, as 
implemented by New York State.
The Progress Report policy was introduced in New York 
City in 2007. It rates schools on a scale of A to F, with grades 
based on three components: school environment, student 
performance, and student progress. A school’s environment 
score is based on attendance rates and responses from surveys 
given to teachers, parents, and students. The other two scores 
are based on student performance in state math and English 
Language Arts (ELA) examinations. While student 
performance measures rely on level scores, student progress 
measures rely on growth or changes in student scores over 
years. The program attaches consequences to the letter grades. 
Higher grade (A) schools are eligible for increases in per-pupil 
funding and bonuses for principals. Schools receiving “F” or 
“D” grades are required to implement “school improvement 
measures and target setting.” Low-performing (F- and D-
schools) are also threatened with changes in their principal, 
and possible restructuring and closure if they continue to 
receive poor grades. The program also makes students in 
F-schools eligible to transfer to better performing schools.
Although the Progress Report program does not have a 
voucher element, it is in many ways similar to the Florida 
voucher program; indeed, its design was based on the Florida 
program. Like the Florida program, it embeds sanctions in an 
accountability framework with consequences/sanctions 
imposed on low-performing schools if they fail to improve. 
Additionally, the criteria of the New York City program that 
make students in low-performing schools eligible to transfer to 
other higher performing schools are similar to those of Florida’s 
program. The only distinction is that in New York, students can 
transfer to public schools only—not to private schools, as in the 
Florida program. The threat of removal of the principal and the 
possibility of restructuring are sanctions imposed over and 
above the transfer option. These sanctions are credible and pose 
a valid threat to administrators. For example, as reported in 
Rockoff (2008), “Seven schools receiving an F and two schools 
receiving a D were told in December of 2007 that they would be 
closed immediately or phased out after the school year 2007-
08. . . . Additionally, 17 percent of the remaining F-school 
principals (and 12 percent of the D-school principals) did not 
return in the school year 2008-09, relative to 9 percent of 
principals receiving a C, B, or A grade.”
Thus, as in Florida’s voucher program, public schools in 
New York face valid sanctions if they fail to perform. Therefore, 
incentives faced by New York’s low-performing schools are 
similar to those faced by the F-schools in Florida, and one 
would expect a similar response from them. Accordingly, the 
above analysis would indicate that low-performing schools 
under the Progress Report program would have an incentive to 
improve. In fact, there is some evidence in favor of such 
improvement. In 2009, 82 percent of students passed in math 
and 69 percent in English, up from 42 percent and 38 percent, 
respectively, in 2002. Earlier, all five boroughs of New York 
City ranked toward the bottom in the state; now Queens and 
Staten Island rank toward the top in elementary-school math 
scores. The racial achievement gap in passing rates has been 
closed by half in some tests. (Statistics are from Elissa Gootman 
and Robert Gebeloff, New York Times, August 4, 2009.) 
Gootman and Gebeloff also report:
At Public School 398 in Brownsville, Brooklyn, 
77 percent of students passed the math tests this 
year and 60 percent passed English, up from 56 
and 43 percent last year. Gene McCarthy, a fifth-
grade teacher, attributed the improvement to 
“a tremendous amount of test prep,” but said that 
with a little creativity on his part, “ultimately I think 
it’s learning.” The principal, Diane Danay-Caban, 
said at P.S. 398, which had struggled for years with 
low scores and discipline problems, she has come 
to feel that the push to raise scores has brought 
genuine gains in knowledge.
Rockoff and Turner (2008) find that schools labeled “F” 
improved their performance in both ELA and math, with larger 
effects in math. Winters (2008), analyzing the same program, 
finds improvement of F-schools in math, although he finds 
no such effect in ELA.
As in Florida’s voucher program, public 
schools in New York face valid sanctions if 
they fail to perform. Therefore, incentives 
faced by New York’s low-performing 
schools are similar to those faced by the 
F-schools in Florida, and one would 
expect a similar response from them.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2010 19
NCLB, a major reform of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act, was signed into law on January 8, 2002. The 
states, including New York, implemented it soon thereafter. 
In compliance with the law, New York established Adequate 
Yearly Progress (AYP) targets, and all schools were graded 
on the basis of the targets. AYP is determined based on each 
school’s progress toward meeting the state proficiency level 
for all students in English language arts, mathematics, science, 
as well as the high-school graduation rate. Schools are held 
accountable for the achievement of students of different races 
and ethnic groups, students with disabilities, students with 
limited English proficiency, and students of low-income 
families. Schools must also have an average over two years 
of 95 percent of their students participating in state tests. If 
a school does not meet requirements in any one of these 
categories, it is said to miss AYP. Schools that receive Title I 
money are subject to NCLB sanctions if they miss AYP in two 
consecutive years. A school missing AYP for two consecutive 
years is required to provide public school choice to students. 
A school missing AYP for three consecutive years is required to 
provide supplemental educational services (such as tutoring) 
in addition to the above sanctions. Missing AYP for four 
consecutive years leads to corrective action in addition to 
the above sanctions; for five consecutive years, it results in 
restructuring in addition to the above sanctions. Thus, sanctions 
start with two years of missed AYP and escalate from there.
While NCLB does not have any voucher component, the 
accountability-sanctions component is similar in spirit to that 
of Florida’s voucher program. In fact, the design of NCLB was 
based on that program. As in the Florida program, NCLB first 
threatens failing schools with sanctions, and sanctions are 
introduced only if the schools fail to meet the predesignated 
targets in the following years.21 Therefore, one would expect 
similar incentives to be created by NCLB and threatened 
21 Note, though, that while under NCLB all low-performing schools face stigma 
(embarrassment) due to public reporting of scores and grades, only Title I 
schools (schools that receive Title I money) are subject to sanctions.
schools to respond in a way similar to the F-schools under the 
Florida program. In other words, one would expect schools 
threatened by the NCLB sanctions to improve their 
performance in an effort to make AYP. However, it should be 
emphasized that these incentives and responses would be 
applicable only if the sanctions are credible and pose a valid 
threat to the affected schools. Under NCLB, though, 
implementation of the sanctions has been largely limited. For 
example, only a fraction of eligible students took advantage of 
the transfer option in New York as well as in the nation as a 
whole. This result is attributable mainly to two factors: the 
absence of an adequate number of spaces in nearby schools and 
the lack of adequate information. For example, as reported in 
the New York Daily News, “Some parents of kids in failing 
schools told the Daily News they weren’t even aware they could 
transfer out, and some were turned away from better schools 
that are already overcrowded” (February 3, 2008).
In summary, both New York City’s Progress Report 
program and NCLB have the potential to induce improvement 
from threatened schools, but the incentives and response 
ultimately depend on how functional and credible the threats 
under consideration are. The challenge to policymakers in such 
programs is to establish—and enforce—credible sanctions that 
function as valid threats to the agents (here, public schools). 
Only in such cases would the agents have an incentive to 
respond in the direction intended or deemed appropriate by 
the policymakers.
9. Conclusion
This article examines the role of program design in the context 
of two educational interventions in the United States—the 
Florida and Milwaukee school voucher programs. Even though 
both programs involve vouchers, their designs are quite 
different: the Milwaukee program makes low-income 
Milwaukee public school students eligible for vouchers, while 
the Florida system ties vouchers to low school performance. 
Specifically, Florida students become eligible for vouchers if 
Only a fraction of eligible students took 
advantage of the transfer option in New 
York as well as in the nation as a whole. 
This result is attributable mainly to two 
factors: the absence of an adequate 
number of spaces in nearby schools and 
the lack of adequate information.
The challenge to policymakers in 
[accountability] programs is to establish—
and enforce—credible sanctions that 
function as valid threats to the agents 
(here, public schools).20 Program Design, Incentives, and Response
and only if their school receives two “F” grades in a period of 
four years. This study shows that program design matters; 
indeed, the design differences have had very different incentive 
and performance effects on schools subject to the two 
programs. Specifically, the Florida program led to considerably 
larger improvements from the threatened schools compared 
with corresponding schools under the Milwaukee program. 
These findings are robust to several sensitivity checks.
The lessons drawn from our analysis are applicable to 
some of New York City’s educational policies. These policies 
include the No Child Left Behind Act, as implemented by the 
state, and New York City’s “Progress Report” policy. While 
neither of these programs has voucher components, both are 
accountability programs that have consequences for schools 
that fail to perform. In that sense, one would expect the 
incentives and responses generated by these programs to be 
similar to those created by the Florida program. Hence, the 
threatened schools could be expected to improve in an effort 
to avoid the sanctions. In fact, there is some evidence of such 
improvement in the affected schools, especially in schools 
treated by New York City’s Progress Report program. 
However, the extent of the responses and the performance 
effects ultimately depends on the credibility of the sanctions 
and the validity of the threat posed to the affected schools.References
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